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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Capital structure theories suggest many ways in which firms can adjust overtime to 
the target debt ratio in order to optimise the cost of capital and maximise the wealth of 
shareholders. In doing so, a firm can use different mixes of equity, debt, and hybrid 
securities. These areas of capital structure have already been extensively researched—
both theoretically and empirically [e.g., Hatfield, et al. (1994); Haris and Raviv (1991); 
Lewis and Sappington (1995); Miao (2005)]. Recent developments in corporate finance 
research show that the optimal capital structure decision is not limited only to choosing 
what percentage of debt or equity should be used, but the decision also has to involve the 
choice of short-term or long-term  debt [Leland and Toft (1996); Myers (1977); Yi 
(2005)].   
In developed markets, firms can easily choose between short or long-term debts as 
per their requirements of optimal debt maturity structure. They are not constrained by the 
availability of either type of debt as the banking industry and capital markets are both 
developed and competitive. Unfortunately, firms operating in developing countries are 
not that lucky. Because of less developed capital markets and instable interest rates, firms 
in developing countries usually find it difficult to use long-term debt. Besides these 
obvious reasons, we need to know empirically what factors influence the debt maturity 
choice in developing countries like Pakistan.  
As far as we know, there is no formal study to empirically examine the 
determinants of debt-maturity structure of Pakistani firms. In a study on determinants of 
capital structure of Pakistani listed firms, Shah and Hijazi (2004) report greater 
percentage of short-term debt in the total debt of the listed firms. Similarly, Booth, et al. 
(2001) and Demiriguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) document higher percentage of 
short-term debt in developing countries. How higher is the percentage of the short-term 
debt in Pakistani listed firms and what are the determinants of debt maturity structure in 
Pakistan? This study aims to answer these questions.   
This study contributes to the empirical literature by presenting evidence for the 
first time on how listed firms in Pakistan make their choices between long-term and 
short-term debt. The empirical literature is rich on capital structure decisions but not on 
 
Attaullah Shah <attaullah.shah@imsciences.edu.pk> is Assistant Professor, Institute of Management 
Sciences, Peshawar. Shahid Ali Khan, Faculty Member, Institute of Management Sciences, Peshawar. 
Shah and Khan 566
debt-maturity decisions. This study contributes to the empirical literature by 
presenting evidence for the first time on how listed firms in Pakistan make their 
choices between long-term and short-term debt. The empirical literature is rich on 
capital structure decisions but not on debt-maturity decisions. There is a need to add 
empirical evidence to the literature on the debt-maturity choices not only from the 
methodological standpoint but also from the view of including detailed analysis of 
large data sets of individual countries, especially from developing ones. In this 
regard, the study contributes to empirical literature by using all relevant models of 
dynamic panel data. Tools like Generalised Methods of Moments (GMM) rarely have 
been used in debt-maturity research. Ozkan (2000) is one notable study that used 
GMM for the first time in debt-maturity research. The assumption that firms swiftly 
change the maturity structures of their debts may not hold true in situations where 
costs of adjustments are higher. If this assumption does not hold true, then the use of 
a static model will not be appropriate. Our results justify the use of dynamic models 
in the debt-maturity research because firms included in the sample find it costly to 
adjust instantly to their target debt-maturity structure, which causes delays in the 
adjustment process.  
The paper is organised as follows. Section one introduces the paper. Section 2 
presents a summary of literature related to debt maturity-structure. Section 3 describes 
the data and discusses the dependent and explanatory variables. Section 4 presents 
various specification choices of the potential model for our analysis. Results from 
alternative specifications are presented in Section 5.  Section 6 concludes the paper.  
 
2.  RELATED LITERATURE 
The basic objective behind any capital structure decision is to optimise the cost of 
capital. Corporate finance literature suggests that maturity of debt can play a significant 
role in lowering the cost associated with debt financing. Four underlying theories explain 
why a firm will have a specific debt-maturity structure. These theories are the agency 
cost theory, the signaling and liquidity risk theory, the maturity matching and the tax-
based model. 
Myers (1977) says that a firm may pass up some profitable investment 
opportunities in the presence of risky debt. This is known as an under-investment 
problem. But if the maturity of debt is short, such problems will not arise as the firm will 
pay the debt before the growth option expires.  This suggests that if a firm has more 
growth opportunities, it will have more short-term debt. Consistent with the above, 
Barclay, et al. (2003), Guedes and Opler (1996) and Varouj, et al. (2005) all find an 
inverse relationship between the proxy for growth opportunities and corporate debt-
maturity.  
Myers (1977) suggests another solutions to the under-investment problem. He 
proposes to match the maturity of a firm’s debts to that of its assets. The maturity matching 
ensures that debt payments correspond to the fall in the value of existing assets. It means 
that maturity of assets should be matched with the maturity of debt. With a different 
argument, Stohs and Mauer (1996) also recommend maturity matching. They say that when 
a firm has longer maturity of assets as compared to the maturity of its debts, the cash flow 
from its assets will not be sufficient to meet the debt obligation. Demirguc-Kunt and 
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Maksimovic (1999) add another aspect of asset maturity in relation to debt maturity. They 
suggest that fixed assets facilitate borrowing by serving as collateral.  
The agency model suggests that smaller firms have higher agency costs because 
the potential conflict of risk shifting and claim dilution between shareholder and 
bondholders is more severe in these firms [Smith and Warner (1979)]. This agency cost 
can be controlled with short-term debt Barnea, et al. (1980). Moreover, the information 
asymmetry problem is severe with small firms, as they find it costly to produce and 
distribute information about themselves [Pettit and Singer (1985)]. Because of 
information asymmetry, their access to capital market for long-term debt remains limited. 
The large fixed cost of flotation of fixed securities relative to the small size of the firm is 
another impediment that stops small firms approaching the capital market [Easterwood 
and Kadapakkam (1994)]. Examining the maturity of firm’s liabilities in thirty developed 
and developing countries during 1980-1991, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) 
find that large firms have higher long-term debt ratios as compared to that of small firms.  
The signalling model suggests that firms generate signals to the outside world 
about their credit quality or their cash flows when they use a specific type of financing 
option. [Flannery (1986)] says debt maturity can reduce the costs of information 
asymmetry between firm managers and investors. He theoretically proves that if bond 
market investors cannot isolate good firms from bad ones, good firms will consider their 
long-term debt to be under-priced and will, therefore, issue short-term debt. Conversely 
in the same circumstances, bad firms will sell over-priced bonds. Flannery (1986) further 
argues that debt maturity serves as a signalling device. Short-term financing subjects a 
firm to more frequent monitoring; hence only good-quality firms will be more willing 
than bad-quality firms to use short-term debt. Highlighting the relevance of transaction 
costs of debt, Mitchell (1991) argues that low quality firms have no option but to use  
long-term debt because they will find it difficult to roll over short-term debt as it would 
subject them to transaction costs which may not the case for high-quality firm. 
Furthermore, financially strong firms can use more of short-term debt as they are better 
equipped to face refinancing risk and the interest risk of short-term debt [Jun and Jen 
(2003)]. Guedes and Opler (1996) find empirical support for the above argument and 
report that financially sound firms use more short-term nonconvertible debt as compared 
to firms that have low credit ratings.  Goswami, et al. (1995) adds another aspect of 
temporal distribution of information asymmetry. They say that a firm issues long-term 
debt when information asymmetry is related to uncertainty of long-term cash flows. 
However, firm will issue short-term debt when informational asymmetry is randomly 
distributed across short and long-term debt.  
Tax-based model, suggested by Brick and Ravid (1985), states that after adjusting 
for the default risk, a firm will preferably make use of long-term debt when the interest 
rate is expected to slope upward, because long-term debt will reduce the estimated tax 
expenses. The basic assumption of their model was that the leverage decision is made 
before the debt maturity decision. Lewis (1990) says that taxes will not impact a firm’s 
value when optimal capital structure and debt maturity structure are determined at the 
same time. Kane, et al. (1985), using dynamic model, predict that optimal debt maturity 
will increase when contracting costs increase, the benefits of tax-shields decreases, and 
the volatility of firm worth decreases. 
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3.  DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
Data 
Data for the study has been taken from “Balance Sheet Analysis of Joint Stock 
Companies Listed on the Karachi Stock Exchange (1999-2004)”, a publication of 
Statistics Department of State Bank of Pakistan. The book contains six years data of 
balance sheets and income statements of non-financial firms.  
For our analysis, we first selected firms for which data was available in all six 
years. Second, care was taken not to include public utility firms, because they are 
regulated differently. There were many firms with negative equity. All such firms were 
excluded from the analysis, as capital structure and debt-maturity structure decisions in 
these firms are influenced by the financial constraints they face. Similarly, firms that had 
accumulated-losses in all six years were excluded. All outliers with 3 standard deviations 
from the mean value were removed. Initially, we included all six years in our analysis. 
However, the construction of some variables required calculation of yearly change, and 
because of this, the year 1999 was dropped. Resultantly, we were left with a panel of 266 
firms and five years.  
 
Dependent and Independent Variables 
 
Dependent Variable 
Empirically, several proxies have been used for debt-maturity. For example, some 
studies have used the ratio of liabilities maturing in (i) 5 years (ii) 1 year to total 
liabilities [(Ozkan (2000)]. Others have used the ratio of debt maturing in more than 3 
years to total debt [Barclay and Smith (1995); Varouj, et al. (2005). Our data source i.e., 
the Balance Sheet Analysis book published by the State Bank of Pakistan does not 
provide data on different maturities of debt. Given this limitation, our measure of debt-
maturity, denoted by DEMA, is as follows: 
debtTotal
year one than more in  MaturingDebtDEMA   
 
Independent Variables 
 
Growth 
Following the under-investment hypothesis, we expect a negative relation between 
growth and debt-maturity. To measure growth, either market-value or book-value based 
approach can be used. Though many research studies on debt maturity structure use 
market-to-book ratio, we use the proxy of annual percentage increase in total assets for 
growth. The reason for this is that our data comes from the years 1999 to 2004. The 
Karachi Stock Exchange experienced a boom in 2002 and onward where share prices for 
a majority of companies increased dramatically. If we use market-value based proxy it 
will unnecessarily indicate that the listed companies experienced abnormal growth in 
2002 and onward. In comparison, the book-value approach provides a consistent measure 
of growth. 
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Size 
Agency theory suggests that agency costs are higher for small firms. These costs 
can be controlled with the help of short-term financing. This suggests positive 
relationship between size firm and maturity structure of debt. The same positive 
relationship is suggested by information asymmetry hypothesis. Furthermore, fixed 
flotation costs of long-term securities make access to capital market difficult for small 
firms that again suggest a positive relationship between maturity of debt and size of the 
firm. Our proxy for the size of firm is the natural log of total asset.  
 
Asset Maturity 
Stohs and Mauer (1996) say when a firm has longer maturity of assets than the 
maturity of its debt, the cash flow from its assets will not be sufficient to meet the debt 
obligation. On the other hand, if a firm finances its short-term assets with longer maturity 
debt, then the funds will remain useless in periods of low activity. This suggests that asset 
maturity has a positive relationship with debt maturity. We use two proxies for assets’ 
maturity; (a) Assmat, which is obtained by dividing net fixed assets on annual 
depreciation charge and (b) Oppcycle, which is a ratio of net sales to net fixed assets. The 
first proxy will capture the maturity of fixed assets, and the second proxy, as argued by 
Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) is a descriptor of the firm’s operating cycle. It 
captures the yearly fluctuations in operational activities. A high ratio of Oppcycle will 
show that the firm may need short-term financing to support sales.  
 
Firm Quality 
Information asymmetry that may exist between managers and investors usually 
results in under pricing of long-term securities. In order to reduce this cost of information 
asymmetry, Flannery (1986) argue that good firms will prefer to issue short-term debt. 
Furthermore, only good quality firms will be willing to subject themselves to frequent 
monitoring that comes after short-term financing. This suggests an inverse relationship 
between debt maturity and firm quality. Following Barclay and Smith (1995), we use 
abnormal future earning as a proxy of a firm’s quality. It is assumed that a higher-quality 
firm will have positive future abnormal profit. Abnormal profit can be defined as follows: 
t
tt
Earning
EarningEarning
Quality
 1  
 
Tax Rate 
In model developed by Kane, et al. (1985), an optimal mix of long-term and short-
term debt is determined by a trade-off that exists between three factors. These factors are 
bankruptcy costs, floatation costs of debt, and the benefits of tax-shields.  They argue that 
debt-maturity increases with floatation costs and decreases with tax-shield benefits of 
debt. Our measure of tax rate is as follows: 
Tax Rate = 
Income Taxable
Expense Tax Annual  
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Table 1 summarises the independent variables, their measures, and expected 
relationship with the dependent variable DEMA. Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for 
variables which are included in our analysis. Further, Table 3 shows means of 
independent variable grouped by industries. 
 
Table 1  
 Independent Variables and Their Relationship with Dependent Variable 
Variables Measure Expected Sign 
Growth %age change in assets Negative 
Size Log of assets Positive 
Assmat Fixed assets/depreciation  Positive 
Opcycle Sales/fixed assets Negative 
Firm Quality Earnings in [(t +1) – t]/ t Negative 
Tax Tax charge/taxable income Negative 
 
Table 2 
 Descriptive Statistics of Selected Variables 
Variables Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
DEMA 1330 0.21 0.21 0.00 0.91 
Growth 1330 0.12 0.25 –0.70 2.32 
Assmat 1330 12.72 7.88 0.00 53.49 
Size 1330 6.76 1.46 1.63 11.08 
Quality 1330 0.31 3.00 –30.00 26.33 
Opcycle 1330 3.97 4.72 0.01 36.70 
Tax 1330 0.27 1.19 0.00 29.00 
 
Table 3 
 Means of Selected Variables by Industries 
  Textile Chemical Engineering Sugar Paper Cement Power Misc. 
DEMA 0.25 0.15 0.11 0.14 0.15 0.40 0.23 0.16 
Growth 0.14 0.10 0.14 0.13 0.10 0.06 0.06 0.08 
Assmat 12.86 11.33 11.05 14.83 9.42 17.24 11.09 14.43 
Size 6.76 6.78 6.43 6.51 5.83 7.62 8.08 5.99 
Quality 0.46 0.23 0.24 –0.41 –0.06 0.98 0.03 0.53 
Opcycle 2.55 5.74 7.09 2.56 6.57 1.38 6.24 6.62 
Tax 0.19 0.25 0.40 0.69 0.23 0.16 0.17 0.18 
 
4.  MODEL SPECIFICATION 
Studying phenomenon like capital structure or debt maturity structure where a 
choice has to be made between two options, one has to make certain assumptions about 
the way the choice is made. In case of debt maturity structure, available options are 
whether (i) to use debt of short maturity (ii) or to use debt of long maturity. If firms can 
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instantly switch between these options and there are no costs of switching over or 
adjustments to reach the target debt maturity structure, we can adopt static model for 
analysis. However, if firms experience delays in the process of adjustments then the use 
of static model will be inappropriate. As reported by Antoniou, et al. (2006) and Ozkan 
(2000), firms do experience delays in the process of adjustment which implies that their 
actual debt maturity structure may not be the desired debt maturity structure. This is why 
we prefer to use partial adjustment model: 


 
k
k
ittiitktiit eXDEMADEMA
1
1,  … … … (1) 
DEMAit is debt maturity ratio of firm i in time t. Xit represents various independent 
variables as discussed in the previous section. i is a dummy variable that capture firm 
specific effects that do not change over time. i is dummy variable for year specific  
effects that do not change across firms like macroeconomic factors. eit is the normal error 
term that is assumed to be serially uncorrelated with zero mean.  
As shown in Bond (2002), the individual effects (i) are assumed to be stochastic. 
If so, these effects will be correlated with the lagged dependent variable DEMAi,t–1 . In 
such a case the OLS estimator of   and k are inconsistent and the estimator of  are 
biased upward because the lagged variable DEMAi,t–1 is positively correlated with the 
error term defined as (i +eit). Within Group estimator can remove this inconsistency by 
transforming the variables such that observations are expressed as deviations from group 
means. The transformation removes the individual effects i. However, such 
transformation invites a correlation between the error term 1
1
tei
T

  and the lagged 
dependent variable 1
1
itDEMA
T

 and the resultant estimate of   is heavily biased 
downward. [Bond (2002)] says that OLS and the Within Group estimates are biased in 
opposite directions and help in evaluating a candidate consistent estimate that will lie 
between the two. Instead of using the Within Group estimate, the firm specific effects can 
be removed with taking the first difference of the Equation (1). 


 
k
k
ittitktiit eXDEMADEMA
1
1,    … … (2) 
However, in the above model too, the error terms eit are correlated through terms 
DEMAi,t–1 and ei,t–1. To overcome this weakness, Anderson and Hsiao (1982) developed a 
model (AH 2SLS) where 2,  tiDEMA or 2, tiDEMA are used as instruments for the first 
difference of the lagged dependent variable. The instruments are correlated with 
1, tiDEMA  but uncorrelated with eit. However, AH 2SLS method does not use all 
possible moment conditions. Further precision in the estimates can be obtained through a 
method of Generalised Methods of Moments (GMM), a technique suggested by Arrelano 
and Bond (1991). Under this method, all available moments can be used by using the 
orthogonality conditions which are present between the lagged values of dependent 
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variable and error terms. Arrelano and Bond (1991) GMM is also called difference 
GMM. However, Blundell and Bond (2000) demonstrate that the difference GMM value  
is biased downward in the presence of finite sample bias which is expected when the 
series is highly persistent. They suggest that one should examine the time series 
properties of each series when using GMM estimator for dynamic panel data models. 
After investigation if the individual series turn out to be persistent, then instruments 
available in first differences tend to be less powerful. In contrast, system GMM which 
was introduced by Arellano and Bover (1995) and late on extended by Blundell and Bond 
(1998) significantly smaller finite sample bias and works with a good deal of precision 
when estimating autoregressive parameters in persistent series. In our case, after 
investigation we found that the variables Size, Assmat, and Oppcycle showed 
persistence.1 Therefore, we report the results of system GMM technique alongside the 
results of OLS, Within Group regression, Anderson Hsiao 2SLS, and difference GMM. 
 
5.  RESULTS 
Table 4 presents five alternative estimation procedures starting from a basic OLS 
in levels, the Within Group (WG), Anderson - Hsiao 2SLS regression, difference GMM 
and finally system GMM. The first two columns of the table show names of the selected 
variables and hypothesized signs. In rest of the columns, coefficients and p-values are 
reported under each specification method. The heteroskedasticity robust standard errors 
are reported in parenthesis below each coefficient value.   In all models there are 266  
 
Table 4 
 OLS in Level, Within Group, AH 2SLS, GMM Difference and System GMM 
Variables 
Predic-
ted Sign 
OLS Within Group AH 2SLS GMM Difference GMM System 
Coeff: p-values Coeff: p-values Coeff: p-values Coeff: p-values Coeff: p-values 
DEMAt-1 + 0.7010 0.00 0.1076 0.00 0.6847 0.00 0.4739 0.000 0.5871 0.00 
   (.029)  (.037)  (.129)  (.077)  (.076)  
Growth – 0.0528 0.01 0.0019 0.92 0.0301 0.31 0.0213 0.350 0.0202 0.35 
   (.02)  (.018)  (.03)  (.023)  (.021)  
Assmat + 0.0025 0.00 0.0043 0.00 0.0051 0.00 0.0063 0.032 0.0060 0.00 
   (.001)  (.001)  (.002)  (.003)  (.002)  
Size + 0.0088 0.00 0.0761 0.00 –0.0088 0.79 0.1184 0.129 0.0304 0.04 
   (.003)  (.023)  (.033)  (.078)  (.015)  
Quality – –0.0015 0.28 0.0011 0.47 0.0017 0.38 0.0026 0.254 0.0017 0.47 
   (.001)  (.001)  (.002)  (.002)  (.002)  
Opcycle – –0.0034 0.00 –0.0042 0.00 –.0013 0.63 0.0002 0.939 –0.0035 0.03 
   (.001)  (.002)  (.003)  (.003)  (.002)  
Tax – –0.0040 0.01 0.001 0.71 –0.0106 0.00 –0.0092 0.000 –0.0074 0.00 
   (.002)  (.002)  (.002)  (.002)  (.001)  
             
No. of Firms  266  266  266  266  266  
No. of Obs  1,330  1,330  1,330  1,330  1,330  
Wald (joint)  2175(7) 0.00 32.12(7) 0.00 5.25(9) 0.00 60.98(7) 0.00 478(10) 0.00 
Wald (time)  10.97(3) 0.01 5.857 0.11 4.96(2) 0.01 9.94(3) 0.02 11.99(3) 0.01 
Sargan Test  –  –  –  31.59(37) 0.72 54.94(56) 0.52 
Difference  Sargan –  –  –  –   0.22 
AR(1)  –0.27 0.79 (3.84) 0.00 –4.76 0.00 –4.7600 0.00 –6.1600 0.00 
AR(2)  0.33 0.74 –6.6800 0.00 1.080 0.28 0.3600 0.72 0.9100 0.36 
 
1Regressing each variable on its one period lagged values yielded the coefficient values of 0.8099 for 
size, 0.6547 for Assmat, 0.7693 for Opcycle, .0150 for Quality, .0396 for Tax, and 0.0835 for Growth. 
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firms and 1330 observations, however, usable observations vary according to estimation 
method. We use Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions to check the validity of 
instruments set. The null hypothesis of the test is that there is no correlation between 
instruments and the error term. AR(1) and AR(2) test whether first and second order 
serial correlation in the residuals exist or not. All models have time dummies to capture 
the effect of macro-economic shocks. The joint significance of these dummies is tested 
by Wald test.  All GMM models were estimated using xtabond2 command written by 
Roodman (2006) for Stata.  
In OLS estimation, the lagged dependent variable DEMAi,t–1 is treated as 
exogenous and firm fixed effects are not captured. As discussed in the previous section, 
the dependent variable which is lagged one period is correlated with the error term and 
the resultant coefficient is biased upward. The WG estimator purges the fixed effects by 
transforming the observations as deviation from group means. However, this estimator 
too is biased but now in opposite direction of OLS. The OLS and the WG coefficients of 
the dependent variable DEMAi,t–1 are 0.7010 and 0.1076 respectively. The AH difference 
regression gives   value 0.6847 that is in between the OLS and WG.  
Estimating the regression with GMM technique, we first need to account for the 
problem of endogeneity and exogeneity of the explanatory variables because the valid set 
of instruments depends upon the relationship between the transformed error term eit and 
explanatory variables Xit. Following the approach of Blundell, et al. (1992), we examine 
the possibility whether the Xit variables are predetermined with respect to eit. If a specific 
explanatory variable xit is correlated with ∆eit and the eit is serially uncorrelated, then 
adding instrument dated t–1 will cause the estimate of the coefficient of x variable to fall. 
Similarly, the possibility of strict exogeneity of Xit variables with respect to eis can be 
examined by including present as well as lagged values dated t–1, t–2, and earlier of Xit 
variable in the instruments set. Again if the coefficient estimates of the X variables fall, 
then the variable cannot be considered as exogenous. As a result of this procedure, we 
found that the variables Opcycle and Tax were exogenous and including present as well 
as lagged values of them to the instrument set gave desirable results. For other 
explanatory variables, instrument set dated t–1 was found to give better coefficient 
estimates and efficient standard errors, suggesting no measurement errors in them.  
However, they were not strictly exogenous. For the lagged dependent variable DEMAi, t–1, 
instruments dated t–2 and earlier were found valid and efficient. The Sargan test of 
overidentifying restriction clearly accepts the validity of the instruments in both of the 
GMM models. The AR(1) test indicates that there is first order serial correlation in the 
residuals, however, AR(2) test provides evidence that second order serial correlation is 
absent. The difference Sargan test accepts the validity of the additional level instruments 
at any conventional level in the system GMM estimation.  
Further precision is obtained with the GMM technique which gives the  value 
below the value under OLS and AH 2SLS estimation, but well above the Within Group 
estimator. The difference GMM gives  value of 0.4739; however, system GMM 
produces a higher value of 0.5871 for . The difference GMM estimates of coefficients 
for other variables too are barely higher than the Within Group estimates. This 
observation provides some evidence of finite sample bias associated with weak 
instruments in the presence of persistent series. For this reason, the system GMM results 
are our preferred results.  
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In all of the above models, the  value is positive and significant. The adjustment 
coefficient,  = (1–), is close to 0.5. It means that there is adjustment process and firms 
face difficulty in instantly adjusting toward their target debt maturity structure. Because 
of the problems associated with OLS, WG, and AH regressions as discussed previously, 
we mainly focus on GMM models for our analysis. All the explanatory variables have the 
predicted signs in all models except the Growth and Quality variables; however, they are 
insignificant in almost all models.  
The variable Growth is insignificant at any conventional level in all models except 
in OLS. The finding suggests that growth (measured by annual percentage increase in 
total assets) does not have any impact on the debt maturity decision. Our results do not 
conform to the under-investment hypothesis of Myers (1977) that growing firms will 
shorten the maturity of debt so as to avoid an under-investment problem. Our finding is 
also in contrast to the finding of Barclay and Smith (1995); Varouj, et al. (2005) Majority 
of the previous research studies on debt maturity structure have used market-to-book 
value of equity as a proxy for growth; however, we use the proxy of annual percentage 
increase in total assets. One may suspect that our proxy for Growth does not effectively 
represent growth opportunities; be that as it may, a similar insignificant relationship is 
reported by Stohs and Mauer (1996), though they use the proxy of market-to-book ratio 
(MV/BV) for growth. 
Though the Growth variable does not support the prediction of agency cost 
hypothesis, our Size variable does support the agency cost hypothesis, given by Barnea, et 
al. (1980), that small firms have more agency problems and will use more short-term debt 
to lower the costs of these problems. The Size variable is positively related to maturity 
structure and is significant in all models except in AH 2SLS and difference GMM. The 
level of significance is 1 percent in OLS and Within Group regressions and 5 percent in 
system GMM. The coefficient value of 0.0304 suggests that Size is the most significant 
determinant of debt maturity structure in Pakistan. As the size of a firm increases, the 
percentage of long-term debt to total debt also increases. Besides the agency cost 
hypothesis, our results confirm to the argument by Pettit and Singer (1985) that 
information asymmetry problem is severe with small firms as they find it costly to 
produce and distribute information about themselves. Information asymmetry makes their 
access to capital market difficult for long-term debt. The large fixed flotation cost of 
long-term securities is another impediment that stops small firms approaching capital 
market.  
The variable Assmat has the predicted sign and is significant in all models at 1 
percent level with the exception of difference GMM where it is significant at 5 percent 
level. In term of importance, Assmat has the second largest coefficient of 0.006 after the 
Size variable. On other hand, the other proxy for maturity matching (Opcycle) has also 
the expected negative sign and is significant at 5 percent level in system GMM and at 1 
percent level in OLS and WG regressions. Both of the proxies for maturity matching 
show that the maturity of debt varies with the maturity of firms’ assets. A firm uses more 
short-term debt when sales and production activities pace up. However, the proportion of 
long-term debt increases when the percentage of assets with longer lives increases. The 
significance of Assmat and Opcycle lend unambiguous support to maturity matching 
hypothesis. 
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The Quality variable as measured by the proxy of abnormal profit has neither the 
expected sign nor statistically significant coefficient in any model. This finding is strictly 
in contrast to signalling hypothesis presented by Flannery (1986) that short-term debt 
serves as a signalling device when information asymmetry between firm’s managers and 
investors with respect to quality of the firm is higher.  
Finally, Consistent with the tax-based hypothesis, the coefficient estimate on the 
variable Tax is negative and significant in all models except in Within Group. The level 
of significance is 1 percent in all models. This shows that corporate tax rate does have an 
influence the maturity structure of debt.  
 
Robustness of the Results 
In order to test the robustness of the results, we estimate the relationship between the 
dependent variable DEMA and the six explanatory variables with static panel data models. 
Specifically, we apply pooled regression model, fixed-effects model and cross-sectional 
model.  Table 5 summarises the regressions’ output for these models. The first two columns 
show the names of variables and their hypothesised signs respectively. The last three 
columns report the results for pooled, fixed-effects and cross-sectional regressions 
respectively. Standard errors are reported in the parentheses below the coefficient values.  
The alternative estimations under static panel data models substantiate the main findings of 
our prior estimations under dynamic panel data models. The Growth variable is still 
statistically insignificant in all of the three models whereas the Quality variable has the 
expected negative sign but is insignificant in the first two models. Assmat, Size and 
Opcycle are highly significant and have the expected signs in all of the three models. The 
Tax variable shows inconsistency in the static models. Though it has the expected sign, it is 
insignificant in the fixed-effects model and cross-sectional model. Overall, the static models 
are in agreement with the results of our prior estimations under dynamic panel data models.  
 
Table 5 
 Regression Output of Pooled, Fixed-Effect and Cross Sectional Models 
Variables 
 Predicted 
Sign 
Pooled Fixed-effects Cross Section 
Coeff: p-value Coeff: p-value Coeff: p-value 
Growth – 0.0014 0.945 0.0005 0.974 0.0175 0.746 
    (.0203)  (.0174)  (.0539)  
Assmat + 0.0074 0.000 0.0039 0.000 0.0065 0.000 
    (.0008)  (.0009)  (.0016)  
Size + 0.0222 0.000 0.0953 0.000 0.0150 0.084 
    (.0034)  (.0194)  (.0087)  
Quality – –0.0019 0.225 –0.0013 0.244 –0.0059 0.039 
    (.0015)  (.0011)  (.0029)  
Opcycle – –0.0135 0.000 –0.0063 0.002 –0.0182 0.000 
    (.0009)  (.002)  (.0029)  
Tax – –0.0078 0.044 –0.0006 0.818 –0.0109 0.248 
    (.0038)  (.0029)  (.0094)  
 
6.  CONCLUSION 
In this study we examine the empirical determinants of debt maturity structure for 
a sample of 266 firms in non-financial sector over the period 2000 to 2004 by using 
Shah and Khan 576
several variants of dynamic panel data models. Our study on debt maturity structure is a 
first one in Pakistan and hence contributes to literature by providing evidence from a 
developing country. To examine the dynamic nature of debt maturity structure, we start 
our analysis with a partial adjustment model using OLS estimation ignoring the 
individual effects. Going a step forward with the model, individual effects are purged out 
with Within Group (WG) estimation. To account for the endogeneity problem, GMM 
estimation is used next and precision in the estimates is obtained with the proper set of 
instruments.  
To test the relevant theories of debt maturity structure suggested in the literature, 
we examine the effect of six explanatory variables on long-term debt ratio which is 
calculated as a ratio of debt maturing in more than year divided by total debt. These 
theories include agency cost theory, signalling and liquidity risk theory, the maturity 
matching hypothesis, information asymmetry hypothesis, and tax hypothesis. We find 
mixed support for the agency cost hypothesis. Our results show that smaller firms use 
more short-term debt; however, there is no evidence that growing firms use more of 
short-term debt as predicted by Myers (1977) that debt maturity is inversely related to 
proxies for growth options in firms’ investment opportunity sets. The significance of Size 
variable also substantiates the information asymmetry hypothesis that information 
asymmetry is greater with small firms and hence they find it costly to approach capital 
market for long-term debt. We find unambiguous support for maturity matching 
hypothesis. Our results show that the long-lived assets are positively correlated with debt 
maturity structure. On the other hand, the yearly ups and downs in operating activities 
cause the short term financing to rise and fall accordingly. The signalling hypothesis 
suggested by Flannery (1986) is not supported by our results. Flannery (1986) had argued 
that good quality firms will use more short-term debt in order to generate positive signals 
to the outside world. Our proxy for firm quality is insignificant in any model.  Finally we 
find support for the tax-based hypothesis. The coefficient of the Tax variable is negative 
and significant in almost all models.  
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